# Time space tradeoffs for attacks against one-way functions and PRGs 

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- Brute force : optimal when restricted to uniform algorithms
- Are better (non-uniform) attacks possible against:
- one-way functions?
- pseudo-random generators?


## Definitions of primitives

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- PRG: $G:[N] \rightarrow[2 N]$ is a $(t, \epsilon)$-secure PRG if for every algorithm $A$ of complexity $\leq t$

$$
\left|\operatorname{Pr}_{x \sim[N]}\left[A^{G}(G(x))=1\right]-\operatorname{Pr}_{y \sim[2 N]}\left[A^{G}(y)=1\right]\right| \leq \epsilon
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- complexity $=$ pre-computed advice + running time.
- Can be implemented on a RAM machine with time and space $t$.
- Similar to circuit complexity.


## Upper bounds

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All above results are actually stated as time-space tradeoffs. Complexity is optimized when $T=S$.

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PRG $G \xlongequal{\text { def }}(f(x), P(x)) \quad T \cdot S=\Omega\left(\epsilon^{2} N\right)$

## Hellman's approach for permutations

$\stackrel{f(x)}{ }$

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At some point, you hit $x \cdot f^{-1}(x)$ is the penultimate point in the sequence.
Time complexity of computation is $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{N})$.

## What happens to large cycles?



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For e.g., store $(a, b),(b, c),(c, d)$ and $(d, a)$ in a data-structure

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Now, compute $f(a), f(f(a)), \ldots$ until you hit $x$

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Note that all the cycles can be covered by $O(\sqrt{N})$ back-links (each back-link covering a distance of $\sqrt{N}$ )
Also, the total time complexity is $\sqrt{N}$ as you hit a "back-link" in that time

## Time and space complexity for inverting permutations

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- Total time $T=\tilde{O}(\sqrt{N})$ and space $S=\tilde{O}(\sqrt{N})$.
- Can be used to invert $\epsilon$ fraction of the elements in time $T=\tilde{O}(\sqrt{\epsilon N})$ and space $S=\tilde{O}(\sqrt{\epsilon N})$
- In fact, we can achieve any time ( $T$ ) space ( $S$ ) tradeoff such that $T \cdot S=\epsilon N$.


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- Cover the graph $(x \rightarrow f(x))$ of $f$ by $m$ disjoint paths of length $\ell$.
- Gives algo with $T=\tilde{O}(\ell)$ and $S=\tilde{O}(m)$ (one back-link per path).
- Problem: $m$ may have to be very large because the graph $(x \rightarrow f(x))$ may not have many long and disjoint paths.



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- Collision probability: $\lambda=\operatorname{Pr}_{x, x^{\prime} \sim[N}\left[f(x)=f\left(x^{\prime}\right)\right]$.


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- Choose $m, \ell, r=\tilde{O}\left(N^{1 / 3}\right)$.

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- Problems: Computing $h_{1}, \ldots, h_{r}$ is hard. Heuristic works only for random $f$.


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- Can again choose $m, I$ such that $m \ell^{2} \lambda \approx m \ell^{2} / K \ll 1$. Can get

$$
T, S=\tilde{O}\left(N^{3 / 4}\right)
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by taking $K=\tilde{O}\left(N^{3 / 4}\right), r=\tilde{O}\left(N^{1 / 2}\right)$ and $m, \ell=\tilde{O}\left(N^{1 / 4}\right)$.

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- First observation: If a table of size $K$ does not invert $f$ with probability $\epsilon$, then the collision probability for the rest is $\epsilon / K$.
- Second Observation: The number of elements inverted by a path is not just the path length, but the the sum of indegrees of elements in the path.



## Issues in analysis

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- Final complexity: $T, S=\begin{array}{ll}\tilde{O}(\sqrt{\epsilon N}) & \epsilon \leq N^{-1 / 3} \\ \tilde{O}\left(\epsilon^{5 / 4} N^{3 / 4}\right) & \epsilon \geq N^{-1 / 3}\end{array}$


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- As in [GT00], show that using $A$, can encode $f$ with $\approx \log (N!)-\phi(N, T)+S$ bits for some $\phi$. Thus, $S>\phi(N, T)$ giving the tradeoff between $T$ and $S$.


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- We show that using $A$, one can encode $f$ using $\approx \log (N!)-\frac{\epsilon N}{100 T}+S$ bits giving us the desired tradeoff.


## Intuition for the encoding

[N]

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- This information along with $A$ suffices to specify $f$ entirely


## Intuition for the encoding



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- Total complexity of encoding : $2 \log \binom{N}{|G|}+\log (N-|G|)$ !
- Putting $|G|=\frac{\epsilon N}{100 T}$, we get that $S+\frac{\epsilon N}{T} \log \left(T^{2} / \epsilon^{2} N\right) \geq 0$


## Upshot of the analysis

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- This was the analysis by Gennaro and Trevisan [GT00]
- The analysis was improved by Wee [Wee05] who showed $T S=\tilde{\Omega}(\epsilon N)$ provided $T \leq \sqrt{\epsilon N}$
- There is still a gap because "deterministically" deciding on $G$ is very expensive.


## Randomized encoding



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## Randomized encoding



- Choose $R$ to be a set of size $N / 10 T$ uniformly at random.
- With high probability, this contains a set $G$ of size $\frac{\epsilon N}{100 T}$ such that
- A inverts $G$ correctly.
- For all $x \in G, A$ does not query any element in $R$

Randomized encoding


## Randomized encoding



- Some savings in the analysis as the identity of $R$ is already known
- Once we know $f$ outside $R$, we need to know " G in R " as opposed to " G in $[\mathrm{N}]$ " - main source of saving


## Randomized encoding



- Some savings in the analysis as the identity of $R$ is already known
- Once we know $f$ outside $R$, we need to know " G in R " as opposed to "G in [N]" - main source of saving
- In all, we can describe the permutation in $\log (N!)-\epsilon N / 100 T+S$ bits which gives us the result.


## Conclusions

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- The best provable upper bound for one-way functions on all inputs remains $N^{3 / 4}$ and $N^{2 / 3}$ is the best for "Hellman"-style arguments (Barkan, Biham and Shamir)
- Techniques for proving lower bounds do not seem to do any better for one-way functions than permutations i.e. $\Omega\left(N^{1 / 2}\right)$.


## Thank You

## Questions?

