Time space tradeoffs for attacks against one-way functions and PRGs

Anindya De

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Joint work with Luca Trevisan - UC Berkeley and Stanford University Madhur Tulsiani - Princeton University

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- Brute force : optimal when restricted to uniform algorithms
- Are better (non-uniform) attacks possible against:
 - one-way functions?
 - pseudo-random generators?

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PRG: G : [N] → [2N] is a (t, ε)-secure PRG if for every algorithm A of complexity ≤ t

$$\left| \Pr_{x \sim [N]} [A^G(G(x)) = 1] - \Pr_{y \sim [2N]} [A^G(y) = 1] \right| \le \epsilon$$

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- complexity = pre-computed advice + running time.
- Can be implemented on a RAM machine with time and space *t*.
- Similar to circuit complexity.

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All above results are actually stated as time-space tradeoffs. Complexity is optimized when T = S.

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[Gennaro-Trevisan 00]	of inputs	for $T = O(\sqrt{\epsilon N})$
[Wee 05]	01 11/2010	O(V C V)


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
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


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









In small cycles of size less than \sqrt{N} , compute f(x), f(f(x)), ...




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


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
At some point, you hit *x*. $f^{-1}(x)$ is the penultimate point in the sequence. Time complexity of computation is $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{N})$.




In large cycles, store back-links at a distance of \sqrt{N}




In large cycles, store back-links at a distance of \sqrt{N} For e.g., store (a, b), (b, c), (c, d) and (d, a) in a data-structure




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Compute f(x), f(f(x)), ... till you hit a point in the data structure, say *a* When you hit *a*, use back-link to go back to *b*




Now, compute f(a), f(f(a)), ... until you hit x




Now, compute f(a), f(f(a)), ... until you hit *x* The penultimate point in the sequence is $f^{-1}(x)$

What happens to large cycles?



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Note that all the cycles can be covered by $O(\sqrt{N})$ back-links (each back-link covering a distance of \sqrt{N}) Also, the total time complexity is \sqrt{N} as you hit a "back-link" in that time

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Time and space complexity for inverting permutations

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- Total time $T = \tilde{O}(\sqrt{N})$ and space $S = \tilde{O}(\sqrt{N})$.
- Can be used to invert ϵ fraction of the elements in time $T = \tilde{O}(\sqrt{\epsilon N})$ and space $S = \tilde{O}(\sqrt{\epsilon N})$
- In fact, we can achieve any time (*T*) space (*S*) tradeoff such that *T* · *S* = *ϵN*.

Abstracting the approach for permutations


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- Gives algo with $T = \tilde{O}(\ell)$ and $S = \tilde{O}(m)$ (one back-link per path).
- Problem: *m* may have to be very large because the graph (x → f(x)) may not have many long and disjoint paths.



Approach for random functions [Hellman, Fiat-Naor]


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Problems: Computing h₁,..., h_r is hard. Heuristic works only for random f.

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• Can again choose m, I such that $m\ell^2 \lambda \approx m\ell^2/K \ll 1$. Can get

 $T, S = \tilde{O}(N^{3/4})$

by taking $K = \tilde{O}(N^{3/4}), r = \tilde{O}(N^{1/2})$ and $m, \ell = \tilde{O}(N^{1/4}).$

Inverting f on ϵ -fraction of inputs


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- First observation: If a table of size K does not invert f with probability ε, then the collision probability for the rest is ε/K.
- Second Observation: The number of elements inverted by a path is not just the path length, but the the sum of indegrees of elements in the path.



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 - Take $\ell^{o(1)}$ time per evaluation.
- Final complexity: $T, S = \begin{array}{cc} \tilde{O}(\sqrt{\epsilon N}) & \epsilon \leq N^{-1/3} \\ \tilde{O}(\epsilon^{5/4}N^{3/4}) & \epsilon \geq N^{-1/3} \end{array}$

 Given A inverting f on ε fraction of inputs in time T and space S, want to show T · S = Ω(εN).


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
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- We show that using *A*, one can encode *f* using $\approx \log(N!) \frac{\epsilon N}{1007} + S$ bits giving us the desired tradeoff.







- A inverts G correctly.
- For all $x \in G$, A does not query any element in G.




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





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- This information along with A suffices to specify f entirely





- Total complexity of encoding : 2 log (^N_{|G|}) + log(N |G|)!
- Putting $|G| = \frac{\epsilon N}{1007}$, we get that $S + \frac{\epsilon N}{T} \log(T^2/\epsilon^2 N) \ge 0$


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
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- There is still a gap because "deterministically" deciding on *G* is very expensive.

Randomized encoding




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



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


- Choose *R* to be a set of size *N*/10*T* uniformly at random.
- With high probability, this contains a set G of size $\frac{\epsilon N}{1007}$ such that
 - A inverts G correctly.
 - For all $x \in G$, A does not query any element in R





- Some savings in the analysis as the identity of *R* is already known
- Once we know f outside R, we need to know "G in R" as opposed to "G in [N]" - main source of saving



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- In all, we can describe the permutation in $log(N!) \epsilon N/100T + S$ bits which gives us the result.



 Non-uniform attacks can do better than uniform attacks on one-way functions and PRGs

Conclusions

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- The best provable upper bound for one-way functions on all inputs remains $N^{3/4}$ and $N^{2/3}$ is the best for "Hellman"-style arguments (Barkan, Biham and Shamir)

Conclusions

- Non-uniform attacks can do better than uniform attacks on one-way functions and PRGs
- The best provable upper bound for one-way functions on all inputs remains $N^{3/4}$ and $N^{2/3}$ is the best for "Hellman"-style arguments (Barkan, Biham and Shamir)
- Techniques for proving lower bounds do not seem to do any better for one-way functions than permutations i.e. Ω(N^{1/2}).

Thank You

Questions?