ICS 2011
|
|
Welcome to ICS2011
Innovations in Computer Science - ICS 2011, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China, January 7-9, 2011. Proceedings, 61-78, 978-7-302-24517-9
Tsinghua University Press
We consider a model of renegotiation in extensive-form games: when it is player i's turn to move, i can "renegotiate" the equilibrium by suggesting new strategies for all players for the remainder of the game. This renegotiation is successful if it improves i's utility, and cannot itself be renegotiated at a later round in the game. Although not all finite games have renegotiation-safe strategies, natural classes of games do. We argue that renegotiation-safety captures rationality in the context of cryptographic protocols in a more meaningful way than traditional solution concepts. We also present protocols for the task of secret sharing that are renegotiation-safe assuming the existence of two non-negotiating players; additionally, we show that such protocols require the existence of at least one non-negotiating player. Preview: 
|
Copyright 2010-2011, Institute for Computer Science, Tsinghua University, All Rights Reserved.