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Title: Resilient Mechanism Design |
Name: Silvio Micali MIT |
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| Time:October 14th (Tuesday) 11:15-12:00 | |
| Location: Lecture Hall, FIT Building, Tsinghua University | |
| Host Unit: ITCS, Tsinghua University |
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|
Title: Resilient Mechanism Design |
Name: Silvio Micali MIT |
|
| Time:October 14th (Tuesday) 11:15-12:00 | |
| Location: Lecture Hall, FIT Building, Tsinghua University | |
| Host Unit: ITCS, Tsinghua University |
We advocate designing mechanisms resilient against equilibrium selection, collusion, and the irrationality of some of the players.
We develop a set of techniques for systematically achieving this more demanding goal in many significant and hard cases. In particular, we exhibit such resilient mechanisms for guaranteeing revenue and/or efficiency in TRULY COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS.
(Based on work with Paul Valiant and work with Jing Chen.)Born in Palermo, Italy, Silvio Micali received his Ph.D. in Computer Science from the University of California at Berkeley in 1983. He joined MIT in 1983, where he holds the Dugald Jackson Chair of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. A member of the Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, he is co-founder and co-leader of the Cryptography and Information Security Group.
Founder of the Algorithmic Theory of Pseudoramdomness and co-inventor of Interactive Proofs and Zero Knowledge, Professor Micali is interested in cryptography, secure protocols, and cryptographic game theory.
Awards
• Gödel - Gödel Prize in Theoretical Computer Science 1993
• American Academy of Arts and Sciences - Fellow 2003
• RSA - Mathematics Award 2004
• University of California Berkeley, CS Division - Distinguished Alumni Award 2006
• University of Pennsylvania - Rademacher Lecture Series 2005
• National Academy of Sciences - Member 2008
• National Academy of Engineering - Member 2007
