Title: New Mechanisms for A New World |
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Name: Silvio Micali | |
MIT | |
Time: October 14 (Wednesday) 09:30-10:30 | |
Location: Lecture Hall, FIT Building, Tsinghua University | |
Host Unit: ITCS, Tsinghua University |
Mechanism design engineers games achieving a social desideratum when played by selfish players. But this beautiful line of research has so far required a few oversimplifications, casting legitimate doubts on the relevance of its solutions. We show that integrating notion and techniques of theoretical computer science and game theory yields a more ambitious, realistic, and robust approach to mechanism design: indeed, an approach better able to meet the new design challenges of our world. |
Silvio Micali is the Dougald Jackson Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at MIT. His research interests are cryptography, zero knowledge, pseudo-random generation, secure protocols, and mechanism design. Silvio is the recipient of the Goedel Prize (in theoretical computer science) and the RSA prize (in cryptography). He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
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